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  Management compensation is always focused by the practical and theoretical 
circles. The absence of owners and insider control exist under the special institutional 
backgrounds in China, which bring about that the managers of the listed companies 
have the power to influence their own compensations. The managers of the listed 
companies are the agents in the principal-agent relationship and have the self-profit 
motives, which make the design of management compensation deviate from the 
optimal contracting approach. At present, the managerial power approach becomes the 
main theory and hot issue to explain the management compensation. 
This paper starts from the nature of the listed companies in China and divides the 
listed companies into the state-owned enterprises and the non-state-owned enterprises, 
comparing the results between them. Simultaneously, this paper uses the research 
findings for reference, standing on the managerial power approach, analyzing the 
direct influence on the management compensation and perquisite consumption, and 
explaining the interactions of management compensation, perquisite consumption and 
corporation performance. This paper chose the 1733 samples who disclosed the data 
of perquisite consumption during 2007-2009. This paper uses the double duty 
syncretism, long-term tenure, stock diversification and integrated managerial power to 
measure the managerial power. After the descriptive statistics, the univariate statistics 
and the multiple linear regressions, this paper analyses the relationship of the 
management compensation, perquisite consumption and corporation performance 
systematically and have the conclusions as below:  
(1) Managerial power and management compensation have the positive and 
significant relationships. Managerial power and perquisite consumption have the 
positive and significant relationship, and the state-owned enterprises have more 
incentives to get the perquisite consumption than the non-state-owned enterprises. 
(2) Perquisite consumption has no relationship with corporation performance, but 
perquisite consumption has the negative influence on corporation performance under 
the circumstance of stock diversification. 
(3) We use the pay-performance sensitivity to reflect the interaction between the 
management compensation and corporate performance. Managerial power makes 













performance and decrease the pay-performance sensitivity under the negative 
performance, and the managers of the state-owned enterprises focus on the latter when 
the managers of the non-state-owned enterprises focus on the former. 
(4) Management compensation has the sticky character, and the more managerial 
power make this character more obvious. 
This paper gives the suggestions of improving the corporation governance 
structure and building the professional manager market to limit the managerial power 
and enhance the relevance between the management compensation and corporation 
performance. 
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2007 年 12 月 26 日，国资委发布了《关于加强中央企业负责人第二业绩考
核任期薪酬管理的意见》提出“业绩升、薪酬升，业绩降、薪酬降”的薪酬理念。
2009 年 1 月 13 日，财政部印发《金融类国有及国有控股企业负责人薪酬管理办
法（征求意见稿）》，强调负责人工资与社会平均工资水平和内部职工收入水平的
关系以及对职务消费的规范，推算出金融企业高管基本年薪 高为 70 万元。2009
年 3 月 1 日开始施行的《关于国有企业领导人员违反廉洁自律“七项要求”政纪
处分规定》中明确了违规自定薪酬、兼职取酬、滥发补贴和奖金的惩罚措施。2009


















就对上市公司高管的长期激励来看，2006 年 3 月 1 日起开始施行的《国有







年 12 月 15 日，中国证监会发布《公开发行证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则
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